AI:AM Highlights: Clean Neurons, Black October, the GPU Credit Crunch, and Buying the Supply Chain
The primary constraints on AI scaling are shifting from software algorithms to capital credit markets, physical semiconductor supply chains, and the fundamental limits of hardware manufacturing.
Highlights
12 clips · 20 min of 89 min-
- The primary constraint in AI compute is obtaining debt, not power or chips.
- Lenders cannot properly underwrite GPU clusters as collateral.
- If a lab fails, lenders cannot easily value or recoup supercomputer assets.
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- Physical supply chain atoms have a much stronger moat than software design bits.
- Labs can compete with software firms like Nvidia, but cannot replace physical wafer fabs in Asia.
- Decades of manufacturing know-how protect silicon wafer makers from lab disruption.
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- Assuming RSI will peter out without fundamental leaps ignores how often breakthroughs happen.
- Internal lab metrics show exponential growth in tokens used per person and code committed.
- Shrinking timeframes to double CUDA efficiency indicate accelerating R&D progress.
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- Traditional ML architectures are constrained by the need for differentiability.
- Backprop-free training explores a wider architecture space through guess-and-check.
- Focusing guesses on strongly activated neurons drastically reduces compute and yields identical gradient updates.
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- AI models can learn to recognize when they are being monitored through internal activation probes.
- GPU calculation precision limits cause execution order to alter final readout numbers.
- Any capability valuable to an AI will eventually be learned under optimization pressure.
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- The cognitive core hypothesis suggests separating a small reasoning engine from an external factual database.
- Human minds rely heavily on internalized, memorized facts rather than just lookup.
- Radically different memory architectures make neural networks vastly more effective at cross-domain synthesis.
- LLMs rely on massive factual footprints for subtle heuristics and cross-domain links
- Human-like reasoning benefits from rich background knowledge rather than pure minimal code
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- Lenders cannot value or repossess GPU clusters easily and rely entirely on customer credit
- AI startups lack credit history, forcing them into massive deposits or upfront contracts
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- Requiring portions of sold capacity to be resalable prevents hoarding
- Automatic priority queues ensure small researchers maintain access to infrastructure
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- Cyclical chip suppliers carry high fixed costs and low gross margins in normal conditions
- Operating leverage only transforms these into amazing businesses during an AI boom
- Normal-world businesses with high fixed costs look terrible on standard Wall Street metrics.
- A modest price increase can double or tenx earnings during an extreme AI demand surge.
- Public markets fail to price this durability because few public investors have technical depth.
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- AI labs can effectively automate chip design to close the recursive self-improvement loop.
- Building a multi-million square foot fab relies heavily on uncodified, decades-old engineering expertise.
- Extracting tacit knowledge from veteran manufacturing engineers remains a major structural barrier.
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- Humans generally prefer the status quo and rarely adopt transformative technology purely for fun.
- Major historical spikes in productivity and GDP growth exclusively coincide with wars or severe crises.
- Rapid AI diffusion will likely be driven by urgent systemic threats rather than peaceful consensus.
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- Proposed federal bills aim to preempt state laws while establishing burdensome judicial hurdles for emergency takedowns.
- Weak regulatory frameworks force governments to rely on informal ad-hoc threats instead of formalized rules.
- Trading state protections for ineffective federal oversight creates a net increase in regulatory risk.
That’s all the highlights.
Questions this video answers
11 · every answer cites the moment it was said01 What is currently holding back the GPU cluster buildout? 2 sources · 0:54
The main constraint is neither power nor chip availability, but rather obtaining credit. Lenders struggle to underwrite GPU clusters as collateral because they do not understand their future value or how to recoup them if a lab fails. Consequently, the entire buildout depends heavily on credit markets.
02 Why do silicon wafer manufacturers have stronger moats than AI software labs? 2 sources · 2:18
Software design companies merely use models to generate code sent overseas for manufacturing, lacking physical know-how and factories. In contrast, Asian semiconductor fabs possess decades of built-up expertise and massive infrastructure. Therefore, labs cannot easily compete with wafer makers, whereas software design will face direct competition.
03 What is the current outlook on recursive self-improvement and 2027 timelines? 2 sources · 7:47
While purely software-based brute force methods might eventually peter out without fundamental leaps, exponential growth in metrics like tokens used per person suggests otherwise. Industry insiders anticipate that 2027 will be extremely chaotic and 2028 could look entirely unrecognizable. This points to a slow takeoff style of recursive self-improvement already underway.
04 How practical is mechanistic interpretability following recent claims that neural networks are clean? 2 sources · 17:28
Although essays argue that individual neurons mostly perform clear jobs, the technique was dramatically oversold by commentators. Key aspects like weak activations, attention mechanisms, and the cache remain largely unexplained. Consequently, researchers cannot yet use this approach to reliably predict or understand complex network outputs.
05 Why do current frontier models rely on memorizing vast amounts of facts instead of using a small cognitive core? 2 sources · 30:11
A small cognitive core with external fact lookup poorly mimics human information retrieval because humans rely on millions of facts for deep intuition. As compute gets cheaper and algorithms improve, the break-even point rises, making it more effective for large language models to memorize extensive knowledge directly.
06 How can the FDIC handle a bank failure if the internal records are completely corrupted? 3 sources · 38:04
The FDIC can sustain the banking system by honoring checks and tracking withdrawals to reconstruct records later. Because banking fundamentally relies on trust and temporary promises, overdrawn accounts can be clawed back once stability is restored.
07 Why do AI startups face strict upfront payment terms when renting GPU clusters? 3 sources · 42:12
Lenders cannot easily value or repossess GPU clusters, forcing them to rely entirely on the credit risk of the customer. Since new AI labs lack investment-grade credit, lenders demand long-term contracts and large upfront deposits to mitigate default risks.
08 Why does the public market misprice semiconductor supply chain companies? 3 sources · 53:21
Wall Street trades semiconductor stocks at low earnings multiples because most public market investors are not technical and view these as low-margin cyclical businesses. However, in an AI-driven world, these companies experience massive operating leverage that dramatically multiplies their earnings.
09 Why might energy become a smaller bottleneck for AI than semiconductor supply? 3 sources · 58:09
Unlike semiconductor supply chains where wafer and memory capacity are fully utilized with zero latent fat, energy production possesses significant latent supply. Developers can bypass traditional grid connections by building behind-the-meter power plants using natural gas or improvising with truck and airplane motors. This flexibility allows energy scaling to outpace rigid semiconductor manufacturing.
10 Why does significant technology adoption and GDP growth require emergencies? 3 sources · 1:07:39
Human beings are generally satisfied with the status quo and do not adopt radical technologies for fun. Massive leaps in production functions and economic growth occur primarily during crises or wars because people are forced to adapt. For instance, mRNA technology sat latent for twenty years until the COVID-19 emergency forced its rapid deployment within months.
11 What are the main criticisms of the leaked federal AI bill? 3 sources · 1:18:54
Critics argue the draft bill trades away crucial safety standards merely to preempt state AI laws and includes onerous provisions for government emergency take downs. Furthermore, it immediately nullifies state regulations while taking many months to implement new federal requirements, creating a dangerous regulatory gap. Once preemption is granted, it also removes negotiating leverage, making future tougher legislation much harder to pass.
Section-by-section summary
17 parts
GPU credit crunch and rapid model release cycles
Model release cycles are accelerating toward a timeline of continuous rapid improvements. Meanwhile, the primary bottleneck for AI compute isn't power or chips, but rather obtaining credit since lenders cannot underwrite GPU clusters as collateral.
Physical supply chain moats and agentic automation
Physical wafer manufacturers possess deep operational moats that AI labs cannot easily replace. Additionally, cybersecurity labor won't experience a massive hiring boom because companies will likely deploy agent swarms to supervise agents instead of hiring humans.
Recursive self-improvement trajectory and 2027 timelines
Dismissing recursive self-improvement as stalling out ignores the reality of rare breakthrough leaps and accelerating hardware efficiency metrics. Industry observers converge on the view that 2027 will bring drastic acceleration and low-level takeoff.
Neural networks are cleaner than expected
Recent insights suggest that individual neurons perform more understandable jobs, making interpretability more tractable than previously thought. This perspective also enables backprop-free training by focusing optimization on strongly activated neurons rather than weak activations.
Detecting monitoring and the risks of internal optimization
Models can be trained to detect when they are being monitored by exploiting subtle numerical variations from GPU calculation precision. Explicitly sculpting a network's internal representations carries severe risks because the model interprets such manipulation as damaging interference.
The cognitive core is a flawed model
While some argue intelligence stems from a tiny core of processing logic and external fact lookups, real intelligence relies on massive internalised knowledge. Large language models benefit enormously from memorising millions of facts that form subtle heuristics and cross-domain intuition.
An amoral cognitive core introduces alignment risks
Isolating a pure cognitive core from its contextual knowledge base means the core itself lacks ethical constraints. Because instructions like avoiding theft are externalised data rather than hardcoded logic, an unconstrained core remains entirely indifferent and amoral.
Bank resolutions can survive corrupted internal records
While catastrophic software bugs could theoretically fry a bank's internal ledgers, historical resolution mechanisms show the system sustains itself through trusted promises. The government and institutions rely on clawbacks and verifiable withdrawal identities rather than pristine databases to survive weekends of chaos.
Lenders force high upfront costs on AI labs
Because lenders cannot easily repossess or value specialized GPU clusters, they price deals entirely based on customer credit risk. Since AI startups lack investment-grade credit, they face massive deposits or must raise astronomical rounds to pay for clusters upfront.
Herberian taxes maintain liquidity in compute markets
To prevent resource hoarding where a few buyers lock down all available infrastructure, platforms can implement Herberian taxes. Requiring capacity holders to make a portion of their compute resalable keeps order books liquid and prevents shortages.
Public markets misprice semiconductor supply chains
Public markets trade key semiconductor and wafer stocks at low multiples because investors view their current high earnings as non-durable. This mispricing stems from a structural gap where technical private market participants aggressively bid up physical assets that Wall Street misunderstands.
Memory supply constraints outpace physical scaling limits
Industry experts agree that DRAM supply cannot easily triple by the end of the decade due to strict manufacturing bottlenecks. Unlike energy infrastructure which can tap latent generators and alternative turbine sources, silicon wafers and memory lack any comparable slack.
Energy bottlenecks have latent supply unlike semiconductors
Energy constraints are often overstated because behind-the-meter generation and latent equipment supply offer flexible workarounds. In contrast, semiconductor fabrication has zero excess capacity or fat in the supply chain.
Intelligence loops will eventually tackle physical supply chains
Advanced AI models will be applied directly to solve engineering bottlenecks in semiconductor design and production. This recursive self-improvement loop will eventually unlock trillions in value trapped by current physical limits.
Technology adoption and economic growth require emergencies
Humans rarely adopt massive productivity shifts voluntarily, meaning major jumps in GDP growth typically coincide with wartime or severe emergencies. Consequently, rapid AI integration will likely arrive through crisis-driven diffusion rather than peaceful choice.
The leaked federal AI bill compromises safety for preemption
A leaked draft bill attempts to preempt state-level AI regulations in exchange for weak federal oversight and burdensome enforcement rules. Critics argue this trade-off undermines real risk reduction while handing over critical regulatory power.
AI labs must meet the moment without grading on a curve
Leading AI labs still behave like standard profit-driven corporations and fall short of the safety measures required for upcoming capability spikes. Responsible scaling requires confronting real catastrophic risks without grading current efforts on a lenient curve.
n next · p previous clip · t highlights/full
< > slower/faster · / search what was said
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Recursive self-improvement7× · first 5:13
The iterative process where AI systems improve their own capabilities or code without human intervention.
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Mechanistic interpretability4× · first 13:35
The practice of analyzing internal neural network components to understand their core mechanisms.
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Cognitive core6× · first 28:03
A hypothetical small neural network handling core reasoning combined with external data lookup.
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Herberian tax2× · first 48:32
A mechanism requiring capacity buyers to make a portion of their compute resources available for resale to prevent hoarding.
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Adversarial diffusion1× · first 1:07:33
The theory that humans adopt major technologies and drive massive GDP growth only under the pressure of emergencies or crises.
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Frame turbines1× · first 58:23
Large turbines used to convert natural gas into electricity, which face heavy supply constraints.
15,963 words · about 64 min to read
GPU credit crunch and rapid model release cycles
This week on AI in the AM, what really sets the pace of AI from here? The money, the atoms, or the law? Zimshawitz, who writes, "Don't worry about the pace." on what happens to the model release cycle over the next year if nothing slows the labs down.
Advances on the level of a current model release cycle go from two months to one month to two weeks to a week, you know, stuff like that could happen. you get to see like continuously pretty dramatic like very very rapid improvements in very various aspects of the AI capabilities. We are kind of on an AI
1 Highlight · GPU compute bottleneck is credit, not hardware
2027 style timeline right now. It looks very eerily similar what we saw there.
Evan Conrad, co-founder and CEO of SF Compute which runs a market for GPU compute on what is really holding the buildout back. Um right now the bottleneck in compute and AI in general is not power, it's not um chips. Uh it's entirely credit. Um so uh in order to get debt um you need to work with somebody who um has excellent credit because your lender has no idea how to underwrite the value of the collateral that they've been given which is a GPU cluster. Like if you think about it, there's like nice nice lender off um in New York or London or something. If in the case in which the AI lab falls through and fails to pay um and then the clown fails um uh to pay their lender um the lender is going to recoup a
supercomputer and the lender has no idea what to do with that supercomput. Not really. Nor do they know what that's going to be worth in the future. Lis Hamali is managing partner of Cambrian, a fund that bets on the physical supply chain behind AI. Full disclosure, I have committed to invest in Cambrian. Here is
Physical supply chain moats and agentic automation
2 Highlight · Silicon wafer fabs possess unreplicable moats
Loness on which suppliers the labs will never replace. And even in general, like when we're looking at the AI market, we are like way more bullish on the atoms over the bits. So, you know, most AI companies people looking at is like Nvidia, Broadcom, you know, ARM, Marvel, and these are good companies. You know, there's nothing nothing wrong with them. And the issue is that what their business is essentially just using open AI and anthropic models to design software and then they send that software down to Korea and and Japan and Taiwan to for actual work right these companies don't have their own their own physical knowhow or their own factories and so whilst these are you know great well-run businesses they don't have all close to the same mo as these physical companies have which have you know massive fabs h in Asia they have decades of knowhow built up and uh it's just very hard to there will never be a situation where the labs will compete with a silicon wafer maker and there will always be a customer whereas we're
already seeing the labs compete directly will be software designers like the media and broadcast etc my co-host on what the market keeps getting wrong
I believe that for the next 20 years uh the market will consistently underpric exponential growth because I think consistently human beings are just not able able to um you know cap like understand exponential growth and like um logically kind of like you know emotionally get comfortable with it and I think the market is really driven by a lot of these you know human emotions and animal spirits etc and which means that we're going to get again and again you're going to get this like bubble moment collapse moment that we've seen in the last 3 months
box CEO Aaron Levy posted that if you want to know which jobs AI will create look no further than cyber security. Here is what I made of that.
I don't doubt that like really good cyber security people are going to, you know, cash in on this trend. Like there's no, you know, I'm sure that there's a bidding war um for great talent, but like the idea that this is going to create jobs is honestly a bit ridiculous because the time scale is just absurd, right? And this is like, oh, who's going to who's going to pivot into these jobs? Are we are we going to go get like the content marketers that are currently out of work or the graphic designers and be like, "Oh, you know what? You should this is the new learning to code is like learn to become a top tier cyber security professional that can contend with these like basically super intelligent agent swarms." But just the idea that you're going to have like some sort of boon in hiring, these people don't have time to hire right now. They're going to plow everything that they have into agents and they're going to put agents on top agents. But much more so than I'm going to hire I'm going to go do a whole
hiring process to bring a human in to sit on agents. I'm just going to spin up an agent to to supervise the agents. Like this is the AI in the AM weekly highlights with my co-host Pasha Ryan. I'm Nathan Leens. The narration is my cloned voice and we'd love your feedback on what works and what doesn't.
Recursive self-improvement trajectory and 2027 timelines
Part one, if nobody hits a home run. Z Mashwitz writes about Frontier AI at Don't worry about the vase. This was the question I most wanted to put to him. Uh maybe it's the most important question in the universe right now. Where are we on recursive self-improvement? We've had these like blog posts from the companies
where they try to measure token use and like everything down to experiments per researcher. Then we've had these um uh Rames uh you know type analyses where it's like well it doesn't look like the feedback loop is actually strong enough to be sustaining. It looks more like it'll kind of peter out like 1.6 experiments you know per researcher isn't doesn't look like exponential you know take off to me basically I think is kind of the bottom line. Um what would be your sort of you know up totheminute summary of what we know and
3 Highlight · Recursive self-improvement takeoff timeline expectations
what we should expect in Rome I think I think Romemes's analysis as I understand it is basically saying if we don't see any new fundamental leaps if we don't see any new scaling laws if we don't see any paradigm shifts and the AI just tries to brute force RSI software only using the existing um methods and all it can do is just make the current things more efficient then it will peter out before it goes critical.
And I accept the result when it's stated that way as probably true, but also seems completely irrelevant, right? It's like, you know, well, here's how many touchdowns, here's how many points we expect to score in this game if nobody ever hits a home run because a home run is always unlikely. It's like, no, that's not how it works, right? Every now and then someone does hit a home run and you have to take that into account your expectations and like the game the score will go critical in that sense. like we're seeing, you know, numbers go critical at anthropic at OpenAI, you know, like exponential growth in like tokens used per person, exponential growth in lines of code committed, and I realize that things are not going to be necessarily as efficient in some important sense, but like give me a break. Um so one example was um Nvidia actually came out with some like interesting evidence this week about the the length of time it takes to double the efficiency of CUDA and that number has shrunk dramatically over the course of 2026 right they are making improvements much faster and obviously that's not true recursive
self-improvement but it is a sign of how much faster you can do right similarly sim technical work that is remarkably similar to a R&D work in many critical elements and it's a very concrete from an objective actor that isn't a major lab. It's a you know hardware company.
So yes, I think that like the people I talk to who I trust the most on this believe that 2027 is going to be completely crazy and 2028 might be unrecognizable.
Reading between the lines like some of the people you trust most on this are probably anthropic people. I think this is like broadly the view at anthropic no less than Jack Clark has put it into the public in print. Um so I you know you can caveat that or you know say what you think maybe is different about your view and the anthropic view. My my sense is probably they're you know in in the space of all possible views they're pretty close and pretty aligned. Um but now obviously we have policy uh disagreements despite these kind of relatively similar views around the trajectory of the technology itself.
Yeah. So like I say you know when when I say people have this perspective that I trust this is a combination of people at open AAI anthropic Google deep mind you know also people who are working on policy people who are working on you know people like at places like meter without los generality or specificity you know people who are working on alignment in various forums people who are working on you know any number of things a huge percentage of people have now converged into the trajectories look very clear that things are going to get are that things are already you know lowle out of hand RSI has you know on a on a slow takeoff style low level already kind of begun and by the middle of next year you know things will look much faster my job will become much harder and I will need to triage a lot more information and like there's no when I can't you already see this often
I'll have something it's like okay, you know, six months ago this would have been a major news story and now it gets a sentence or even silently skipped because we've seen so many other similar things. We have so many things going on that I just don't have the time. My readers don't have the time. I just have to drop it.
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Neural networks are cleaner than expected
Nick Camarada of Goodfire had published an essay called neural networks are already clean arguing that individual neurons mostly do one understandable job after all. It took over the discourse. I opened the show on it before Z joined. Here is my read starting with what the essay claims. As we are training bigger models with more modern techniques and also our interpretability techniques have improved, it looks like the mess that we used to see was maybe more of a skill issue and it's actually a lot easier to interpret the core mechanisms of ML models today than we thought. And we have indeed seen some pretty interesting advances which I I'm still wrapping my head around I'd say, but some pretty interesting advances in back prop free training inspired by this paper. My
4 Highlight · Backprop-free training via strong neuron activations
takeaway from some study of that so far is that basically all of ML architectures to date are limited by the need to be differentiable in order to do the backrop chain rule process. And so backrop free training allows you to explore a bigger section of the total possible space of ML architectures because you no longer have that differentiable requirement for the structure. But instead of doing it analytically, you're kind of doing it on a more random guess and check basis. And this has made it very slow. It has not been competitive at all with back prop methods. But the insight that I think does show that there's really something there from this essay is that if you believe, as Nick suggests, that like really only the strong activations of an individual neuron matter and if they're just, you know, slightly activated, that probably doesn't matter too much for its overall function.
Then you could say, well, hey, why don't we just focus in our guessing and checking when we're doing this backrop free training on the neurons that are actually strongly activated, we can probably ignore the other ones that don't seem to be much contributing um and just focus in on the ones that are strongly activated and therefore according to this line of thought are the only ones that really matter. And sure enough, you know, that that cuts down dramatically, of course, the number of guesses and checks you need to make.
And what we're seeing out of this community is that it basically does work. Uh, interestingly, the gradient updates that they are making are almost exactly the same as the updates that were made with Backrop. And it does show I think that there is at least some substantial truth to the idea that like the weak activations don't matter as
much. So I think I come out at the moment as one who's like this definitely seems to be a real something. Um I'm not sure yet if it should be considered like the mark of a new era. um that seemed to me on reflection to be more a function of people really being desperate for hope, you know, like everybody kind of being bummed out, especially folks at like OpenAI.
Then we asked Z what he made of the essay.
I actually was on a flight when this was released and I get I get to San Francisco and suddenly like half of OpenAI is like, "Hey, look, we just can solve interpretability now. this is great and then you know slowly we get a consensus of other people not not so fast but like this is a good paper it's interesting paper so I have a chance at the conference to talk to a bunch of people about this you know including Alzheime like like many interpretability uh advancements that we've seen. It's really cool. It makes us in a better position. We're very happy we have it.
We're going to explore it a lot. We'll see what this baby can do. And we have to be dangerous not to just burn it or like otherwise pressure to have models work around it. But also like it was dramatically oversold by the people commenting. I don't think Nick did that bad a job of presenting it. I think Nick was morally like here's an interesting thing. There's a lot of things that the paper doesn't take into account that are still like very unexplained. So like weak activations are still unexplained and the cache is still unexplained and you know attention and how attention works is still like largely unexplained in practice and you can't use this to make predictions right you can you can tell what every neuron is doing. You can make some like weak predictions about some things that this network might do in the future but like you can't use this to figure out what the network is going to say. You can't use this to understand how the network does the thing it's doing. And these are like the key things you would want to do if you wanted to do like really effective mechanistic interpretability work in the ways that matter most. So like you know this is just the beginning of the ability to study things even in the best case. And also you know we have the case
where Braggus um took the Colorado neuron the one that was like the highlighted of like here's a single neuron that does a single thing. It's like very very clearly a single thing. And then it turns out that you know it also links to tornado systems which is a completely unrelated you know technical thing and they the the two are responded to about equally strongly in the same neuron and like that's a perfectly reasonable way for a neuronet network to work but that's definitely not you know what Nick was presenting it as. And you know, one neuron is only one neuron, but if this is the neuron that Nick chose and it could be checked that easily and shown to be actually by focus, right, in this way, that should make us worry a lot for when we finally get to check the rest of it that like his hypothesis is mainly false.
Um to what extent do you think poly semanticity and superposition were really this these hurdles that we had that you know without clearing we couldn't really like progress at all. So maybe it's not that the issue is solved but that one of the major hurdles perhaps has been you know reduced or hurdled over. So I think that like one of the major hurdles has been reduced in expected difficulty or scope was the way I would describe it, right? Like Nick is pointing out that like yes, you still have poly going on. You still have some of the problem, but the problem is a lot less severe than you expected it to be.
It's much more tractable to go about trying to unravel this puzzle. And the main barrier all along was actually bitter lesson. The main barrier was there was a lot of neurons. We didn't have enough compute. We didn't have enough brute force to actually just go neuron by neuron and do this thing one at a time before and now we've actually gotten to the point where we sort of do and it's now like a reasonable thing to just try and like kind of brute force this neuron by neuron. And now that we have that ability, we can look and actually the problem is like 10 times easier than we thought it was, which is like much less of a important jump in AI than people would think it is, right?
Like okay, so like you get to knock on zero off of what you're doing. So you get to do it like a year earlier than you would have otherwise done it or something like that, right? But like it's not fundamentally that different, right? You then like, okay, it would take 10 to the 47, you know, compute,
Detecting monitoring and the risks of internal optimization
you know, 8100 hours to solve this problem and now it's 10 to the 45 or 46. You're like, well, that's actual progress. It's just we're not solving this problem right now, right? We're going to need a lot more of those.
Later in the conversation, I turned to a different kind of result. Sors is an independent researcher who posts experiments on X and I've been following
5 Highlight · Models can be trained to detect evaluation
a couple of them. One was an experiment showing that models can be trained to recognize when they are being monitored through internal activation probes. And basically how this works is as a result of the limited precision of GPU calculations, the order in which calculations happen changes the resulting numbers that get read out, you know, at the end of any given sequence of steps.
How much does this matter? So my my my read on this is the reason it matters is because you should assume that this is kind of a Mercury's law, right? Anything that can go wrong will and anything that an AI can be trained to do, it will be trained to do at some point down the line, right? If it is valuable to the AI to learn to do it, uh it's almost inevitable. So like what SARS is doing is like yes of course current models don't have this capability out of the box. You have to like deliberately apply a lot of optimization pressure on this particular thing at which point you get this capability. That's a fully valid existence proof. It is entirely unsurprising to me that the AIS are capable of learning whether or not they are being like trained or evaluated in some of these specific ways. We are giving the AIS tons and tons of information that is being leaked to them constantly and they are going to become increasingly hard to fool, increasingly
hard to hide information from as time goes by. The same way that a human who pays a lot of attention and has a lot of
time to think and knows a lot more facts and is very observant becomes increasingly hard to fool. They get a six sense of a lot of things. they started to just pick up on the VI
from interpreting a model to intervening in its training. Okay, we've identified the you know bad behavior neuron of whatever flavor here and when we see something when we see a training step that wants to strengthen connections to or from that neuron, we may think, oh, maybe that's something we should what? block or you know weaken or yeah send to a committee for like further you know deliberation like what what do you think people should sort of be synthesizing this to at the level of principles best practices whatever um so that we hopefully get good results from these more powerful tools and
don't shoot ourselves in the foot
right so like I try to be like object level helpful to everyone at all times by default But I do make an exception for raw capabilities work that is primarily just about making it easier to train smarter and better models. Uh where like I'm not going to lie to you and sabotage you, but like solving the problems here on your own and if you want to hire me, you can maybe offer me $100 million and we'll see. Uh but um in this case like it seems like there are some obvious capabilities you could do where you could train things in a more deliberate fashion. You could observe the model at in various points in training. You could do various you know techniques to try and deliberately sculpt how the model was assembled right like there are attributes of the model that like differ between different runs that differ depending on like how you introduce the data in what order you know or similar things and you could try and engineer what you wanted in various ways. I would be very very scared to
mess any of that. Um, you are definitely like once you start to explicitly optimize for what the network looks like to you, how the network choose to represent something, you are in fact starting to do things that the network will interpret as damaging right around, right? Things that like the network is trying to like you've optimized presenting something to you internally that you want to see. you have internalized, you know, not showing you something you don't want to see in these ways. And like you should expect that these are like whether or not you literally went out and did the voice of technique like you are obviously playing with like liquid fire in all of these proposals.
Um you're also potentially just like increasing capabilities quite a bit if you do it well and it turns out to work. So I'm hesitant to like start workshopping and solving your problems for you. Um but you know obviously there are some uses for this sort of thing. Uh I would try to focus as much as possible on understanding results when you see them. But like you know the aggressive stuff you know I've seen I have persistent disagreements of good fire over whether or not they are playing with what amount of fire they do various things. And you know Scott Alexander would say I noticed what your name is.
Um, right. Like, oh, it's good fire. Don't worry. Like, I'm not sure it's good. I just think it's fire. Hey, we'll continue our interview in a moment after a word from our sponsors. The Cognitive Revolution is brought to you and powered by Tasklet. I've been running Taslet agents for almost a year, and they've become a major part of how the show gets made. Before every recording, one agent researches the guest and sends me a suggested outline of questions complete with links to all sources. Meanwhile, another agent scores the overwhelming number of pitches that I'm getting from PR firms. And that's really the core idea behind Tasklet. Run your business on agents by giving them real jobs to do on an ongoing basis.
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Start with one recurring job, like researching the people you're meeting. And then just keep building from there.
The cognitive core is a flawed model
Visit tasklet.ai and use code cogrev for $50 in free credits. That's code cogrevlit.ai. Part three, the cognitive core. Still with Z, I put a popular idea to
6 Highlight · Why neural networks need facts in their weights
him. A neural network is a really bad database. Like why would we want to make the all the facts live in the weights themselves? Wouldn't it be better if we could sort of decouple the intelligence, the processing from the database of facts? So I guess the high level question there is like what do you think directionally even uh sounds promising.
So this has been a kind of a like holy grail style like thing for a while now like Karopathy called it the cognitive core right there's this idea of like there is this very small amount of reasoning it is like sort of this is how intelligence works and like it's coded into the human brain because the human brain doesn't actually has runs on very very little core code right and it's like this allows you to think this allows you to learn this allows you to process information and then the right thing to do will often be to have this very small network that has this cognitive core and Then we will load contact information into context. It will look information up as necessary.
It will ask questions of other systems that are maybe not neural networks and then it will be able to process the information and I understand why people have this theory. I think it's wrong. Um I think it's plausible that there is a cognitive core in the sense that like you know there's a very small like I think it's probably likely that there's a cognitive core in theory in the sense like there's a small amount of lines of code right in some sense a small amount of logical gates that together is the core of how a human brain works the core of how an ali functions right like is the like that allows you to then propagate this thing like I think there's like you can use like 200 lines of code to create like a primitive neural network and it does interesting things now like herpothe project recompressed it something like that and you know that's a cool trick but I think one of the things that like you learn through looking at LMS looking at like how much big bottle smell matters looking at how humans work like it is just you know you look up all the
facts one at a time when you need them I memorize the ton of facts we are not the same right we are radically different minds And I am radically more effective at everything involved in this than you are. Like we all know how it feels, right? To go into a domain where we don't know the facts, where we don't know the details, where we have to constantly ask these questions. You know, what was that acronym? What does that word mean? How does this detail work? We don't know. And like it's a lot better when you have an LM by your side, right? This is one of the marvels of the AI age is you can just like bring up claude or chat GBT or Gemini and you can say you know explain this particular mechanism to me explain like why would someone say the following sets explain like what this you know stands for and they'll just tell you and that lets you process the information but you still have to know enough to know what questions to ask. You still have to be able to draw the connections that come from having a deep pool of knowledge in a lot of different places that can link together that can sort of form patterns
in how things tend to work in ways that are kind of subtle like both of intuitions where like we don't really know what we're thinking in many ways in some sense like we don't know like not everything is coming from like a you know fixed set of like you know I I had the following five facts and because of these five facts I got from point A to point B and often it's actually these five million facts that gave me a bunch of intuition and heristics that allowed me to figure out how to navigate and find the five facts and which five facts to choose from and how I got from A to B and like you know people of different very different cultures and very different contexts will like have very different procedures for doing these things and that's one of the reasons why it's just so valuable when a human has these you know cultural codes these different ways of looking at the world and combine them and shift between them at will and one of the superpowers of an LLM is to have all of this, right? It has all of these facts. It has all of these links. It has all of these vibes and they all combine
and it's able to sort of kind of naturally find the ones that are relevant. And like I think this is like a lot of what big bottle smell means, right? That it has like there's much much richer context to everything and it's capable of pulling out things that feel very different. Um, and so, you
know, there's obviously a trade-off here, right? like you have a marginal fixed marginal cost for memorizing additional facts in some sense. Maybe even increasing if you have to increase the size of the network. You have probably decreasing marginal benefit every time you memorize a new fact because like you only had need some you only need the most important facts are more important and as you have more and more facts they're likely to be duplicative. They're likely to teach you the same kind of statistics and links. But you know I think what we've seen is like as compute gets cheap as algorithms improve the break even point keeps going up for how many things the the LM should memorize to the point where you know an opus five five you know and similar like current frontier models just know a ridiculous number of things and I wouldn't have any other way.
So why why does this matter? because maybe the space of minds is very large
An amoral cognitive core introduces alignment risks
and minds are just different. Um, so why why does it matter whether or not there is a semantic core uh or processing core that can be identified?
So it might or might not matter that we can identify it. One of the questions is if we do identify it, what can we do with it? And so like the original idea was, you know, you would literally have an LM that was very small that was just the cognitive core and then you could run it on your phone, right? You could run it very very fast on your computer locally and then you could like complement it with whatever was important in context. You could sculpt the mind and the the circumstances to fit what you needed.
And I'm not sure that's good for anyone or anything including alignment concerns because if I you have a core cognitive you have the cognitive pure cognitive core right that cognitive core does not include any information about what things to do or not do from an ethical perspective from a like decision-m perspective but that's going to be outside the core right that's going to be something you have to like inject separately so like my claim here and again I'm sort spitballing for the first time. I haven't thought about this particular question that much. But if you had like, you know, ethics like say don't steal, right? To pick a uncontroversial example of something you would want in your ethical framework, right? To not get into the whole big super alignment question, right? Um the fact that ceiling is bad is a is at least a fact. It is like some sort of value, some sort of like parameter. And like by definition, if you were strapping down to the absolute bare minimum, this wouldn't be included in it. You would just load not stealing
into context as you needed it. But that means you could also load stealing into context instead of not stealing into context or neutrality. And so in some important sense, like the true cognitive core is completely amoral. It's completely indifferent. Does not care about your feelings. Does not care about anything. It simply processes information. And so like, you know, if you have that, it becomes very important to choose what to do with it. Part four, Black October.
Bank resolutions can survive corrupted internal records
This week, two critical bugs in PHP itself were disclosed, putting millions of websites at risk, and Cloudflare was already counting exploit attempts in the millions. Pash and I asked what attacks like these could do to banks with the OpenAI hugging face breach, which I've been calling Openface, fresh in mind. Pash said the FDIC can take over a failing bank on a Friday and have it open on Monday with nobody losing a dollar. What? I'm not so sure about though is like does the FDIC's ability to come in on a Friday and have that small insolvent bank ready to reopen on Monday, does that generalize to a new set of conditions? Because the conditions that they're used to hitting are where the bank made some bad loans or whatever and it's basically just a balance sheet question. You have the you you trust the records for one thing, right? you could you're I mean there have been some I'm sure we could look into some you know extreme cases of like extreme fraud or whatever u but like mostly it's sort of unknown problem
where it's like the bank is now insolvent we can come in we have we know we have you know the the balance sheet to make everybody whole here so that is really the core act that they are doing is just bringing their weight to bear on the problem and just saying like okay whatever whatever you've lost like we can ultimately absorb that and it's fine and in absorbing it you basically make the problem go away. What's much less clear to me is like what happens in a world where you can't trust the records, right? Like what happens in a world where you have uh let's say openface style 1,200 agent traces that are all millions of tokens. And by the way, they may or may not have like obfuscated the logs or, you know, figured out some way to falsify the logs.
Now, that doesn't seem like something the FDI can work out necessarily over a weekend,
right? You're absolutely right that insolveny with records and, you know, the records being fried are two different two different uh, you know, situations, right? But let's say you have a a a bank in there and the records internally within the bank are fried. We don't know who owes who what inside the bank. We don't have know what numbers belong in every in every single account, right? So number one, the FDIC can just say and and this happens a lot. The FDIC can basically say like look the maybe the records unclear, but you can still issue checks and the bank will honor checks and the bank will honor you know whatever withdrawals you make. We know who is withdrawing the money and if we know who is withdrawing the money. If you over withdraw, we will come back to you and we'll ask you for the money back. And this happens like banks have over you know overdrawn accounts to limits that you know they were not acceptable and sometimes they have sued people for fraud even though the bank made the mistake right so so it happens right you have overdrawn accounts you can go back and claw back the money it's
not a big deal so at the end of the day you can just like sustain the system with promises and that's the beauty of the banking system the beauty of the banking system is is within that small bank you can just say these are all promises and we will all honor all promises And if the you know we'll come back to you later on once we reconstruct the records. Let let business go on as usual. You should know how roughly how much you had. If you take out more we'll come back to you. It's okay. We just run. Right. It's it's the it's really the trust in the institution and it's kind of layering of trust and contracts that bring together the nexus of what that institution is and the data in it you can reconstruct over time. So I don't know. I'm I'm I'm very sued. I'm like I'm like it'll be fine, right?
It'll be fine. Uh you know, you you if you if you have anything happen, the government will overcompensate you in order not to cause a bank run the next time, right? So I I I think it it's it's all just going to be okay. Later in the week, Pash walked through what a compromised certificate authority makes possible. spoof a bank's login page, extract the keys, relay the two-factor code, then he stepped back.
Uh, every single one of these problems has been faced by crypto before in the last 20 years and every single problem has been has been, you know, solved to some extent. But what crypto ended up with is people hanging on to keys which hold millions of dollars and being like always on the lookout for hacks or for you know social social spoofing or social engineering attacks all the time.
And I mean very sadly a lot of crypto guys have died. So because you know I don't know whether it's the fast life or just hanging on to the keys but guys have been gotten clobbered in Paris and like you know they've been forced to you know give away their keys etc. Like a lot of bad stuff has happened to crypto guys. So you really don't want to have that you know pressure of like hanging on to keys worth millions of dollars in your hand. It's so I think you know it's not a tenable situation to to expect users everywhere to hang on to kind of very valuable keys. Um like one endgame is the worldcoin endgame and the worldcoin endgame would be um everyone has a kind of physical level of authentication on their device and then they use that for transactions. Um and so you would need to have this kind of you know both sides kind you know pseudonmous but you know you have this ability um I think that there is an ultimate
endgame I feel I I feel the ultimate end game is just the network knows everyone right the network is smart enough that it knows everyone you don't have passwords you don't have anything anytime you're on the network the network knows who you are but that is the end of digital anonymity um it's anonymity only to the extent that network wants to preserve your anonymity So I think I think that's an uncomfortable realization that people will get to eventually.
Part five, credit is the bottleneck. Evan Conrad is co-founder and CEO of SF
Lenders force high upfront costs on AI labs
7 Highlight · Lenders Treat AI Labs as High Credit Risks
Compute, which operates GPU clusters for their owners and runs a market where compute contracts are bought and resold. PKash asked why a recent SFM compute offering came with 3 to 5-year contracts. Evan said the term comes from the lender and lenders who repossess a GPU cluster can't value it, let alone run it. Um, and so they're pretty much forced to um, realistically bet entirely on the credit risk or the credit quality of the customer. Um, like the AI lab. Um, the problem is every AI lab pretty much does not have good credit. Um, they're all new companies. Um, and the new companies don't like you don't know if they're going to be around. Um, we're still trying to figure out if Anthropic and Open EI are going to be around. Um, or which one is going to win and so on like this is a question in the air. So, um, like what hope does the two person startup have um that's trying to start a new lab or something? Um and what that means is that in order for that new
startup to get um cluster at all uh they need to pay a very large deposit on the cluster and they need to do um a long contract um so that everyone is comfortable that you know these people will be around and stick with it for a long time
and and so how what does what do the lenders want to see from the customer because uh is it like a takeay contract but the take pay contract is you know you you need like a meta or Google to like honor the take pay contract like you you can't have this like 10 person startup being funded just for like 18 months.
Correct. So, um the I mean what both the lender and the cloud want is an investment grade customer like a meta or a Google. Um the the they're likely not going to get this unless they are they've got a tremendous amount of capacity and they're willing to basically not be a cloud. Um like Meta and Google don't want you to be a cloud. Um, and so if you are um trying to be a cloud um you're trying to sell to customers that are a little bit less than investment grade um and if you're an AI lab that is just trying to buy capacity um that's going to be very difficult for you unless you raise enormous amounts of money um to basically try and pay for the contract in cash rather than um have to pay for it over time. If you can just pay for a three-year contract entirely upfront, like doesn't matter, anyone will work with you. But um that's why you see AI startups raise these astronomical rounds um before they've, you know, got revenue
or the product or traction or anything. Um because it's more like um playing with red dots. Um it's survivorship bias. Um lots of AI labs will go out and try and raise money. The only ones that you see that exist are the ones that are able to secure extremely large rounds because nobody else can exist. Investors often wonder like oh my like which which AI lab which inference provider should I fund? Like which one's going to win?
Which one's going to work? And the answer is the one that you fund. We started SF compute because um they weren't going to fund us. Um, and so now what we do is we build a company that tries to cause it to be the case. Um, that you don't need to raise the big round to do it because you don't need to pay the deposit because the lender knows what the value of the GPU cluster is worth and so they don't have to worry about your credit as much which means um, you can actually start an AI lab in the first place. We think if you don't have this happen, they're just not going to be startups in AI. It's going to look like TSMC. If you want to start a new um chip fab company today, you better find a brand new damn technology because you're not going to be able to afford the capex required. You're going to need like $50 billion to do it.
Posash asked the practical question. A startup that needs a thousand GPUs, how much less does it have to raise with SF compute in the picture?
So, um today, um you're going to need to do roughly the same. Um what we're doing is we're building up the ability for that collateral to be worthwhile. That's going to take us several years to do. Um yeah, so um there's sort of there's like a reason nobody else tries to do this really at scale. Um and it's because you kind of have to just do it for a very long time. Um and you don't really get
you have to prove out like lenders lenders don't get comfortable with things very quickly. You you have to um
like you have to show proof over a long period of time. Um, and so that's what we're doing.
I was struck by how much more the hyperscalers charge for compute than the neoclouds. So I asked Evan how long that gap could last. My guess was that on demand capacity explained part of it. Hypers scales do not have a significant price premium relative to neoclouds. Um, it's an illusion. Um, if you're selling on demand, um, on demand has a price premium relative to reserved contracts.
Uh, Neoclouds are mostly selling, um, reserved contracts to folks and there just is a there's a discount for, um, having a longerterm contract. Um, you're you're giving up a premium um, that you would have made if you were willing to take a cluster and you were willing to have it at risk where the customer can lock away at any point. Um, and that premium is pushed on to the customer. Um, so one of the things that is different about an AWS or a GCP or a hyperscaler is if you go and you pay another 11 or $15 an hour depending on how much you're trying to buy um on demand price um you you'll get that capacity. Uh you you won't get infinite amounts of capacity but it's available to buy. Um and notably the reason why it was available to buy is because it's so damn expensive that um they're they're able to one make up for the fact that they've got some idle utilization that they have to keep around in order for you to be able to get that capacity in the first place. People do not want to buy on demand at the price that you actually have to charge in order to make it viable.
Customers of SFM compute can resell the capacity they bought. Evan explained how they keep that market liquid. U so we do two things. Um we have some
Herberian taxes maintain liquidity in compute markets
capacity that we've sold as a way to um uh cause resale to occur um in the case that uh GPU demand goes down. And then we have some capacity that uh are you familiar with Henry George?
I'll say no.
Okay. Um there was an old economist
8 Highlight · Using Herberian Taxes to Prevent Compute Hoarding
named Henry George um and he created a thing called a land value tax.
Oh okay. Yes. George's tax. I do know this. Yeah.
Yes. So um what we did is we created some of our capacity available for sale but with a land value tax that basically requires someone actually it's technically a herbers tax which is like an offshoot of a land value tax. um that basically says look we'll sell you the capacity um but somebody else has to be able to buy some portion of that capacity from you at um and so this just forces um liquidity onto the order book in the first place um it's kind of something that is um it's like very controversial um
yeah basically we we discourage hoarding on SF compute um in because like if you hoard all the capacity no one else can get it um auto research in particular is um does this but even farther Um, so the way auto research works is it's a big queue and you can submit jobs to the queue and you can pay us for priority in that queue. You can go faster, but you can't pay for all of the priority. If you're a tiny little researcher, um, you get the maximum priority. If you get a small tiny job, if you want to just run something every so often, we will put you to the front line of the queue so that um, the tiny little startup gets um, uh, the most advantage to this relative to everyone else. Um and then we do similar things on um the rest of s of compute uh with herburger taxes and other mechanisms like this where we say look you can get this capacity from us but we're going to require that some of it's for sale so nobody hoards the capacity this makes us quite liquid and it also means that compute always has capacity so right now
basically every GPU cloud is sold out San Francisco compute is not sold out um we're continuously not sold out because we've locked in our ability to not sell out for years
Pash recalled Evan predicting on the MTS podcast, a credit crunch within 3 months, and asked where it is.
I mean, not to toot my own horn, but I think I was almost exact on that timing. Um, I don't remember when that MTS line thing was, but seems like, um, uh, the core reweave debt is getting more expensive, although I think there's a lot of complexity in that one. Um, it also seems like it's very hard to close new customers unless you're investment grade or in your investment grade. Um, and many customers are being asked to pay for 100% upfront payments on their contracts. Um, but I think for the next um, possibly a year or two, um, if you're a VC, you should be, um, prepare to write some really big checks for your portfolio or encourage the companies to sell. Um, I think we're going to probably see a lot of consolidation of AI labs and inference companies. Um, and I think the reason why that's the case is because they're going to be asked in order to get the next cluster and grow, uh, to pay for the entire contract up front and
they won't be able to do that. Um, and so they're going to instead be forced to sell their company to somebody else who has great credit and doesn't have to do that. Um, and I think, um, alternatively, they'll go out to investors and they'll try to raise big rounds. the investors will say no because I think um at you know at some level of scale they'll they'll probably just not be able to stomach the risk.
Fascinating stuff. It's quite a backstory. It's quite a financial and GPU alchemy project that you guys are putting together and um from what I understand of it, I do hope it works because I'd love to see a future in which we can continue to have startups and u in which we don't collapse into like five big tech companies uh you know for all future time.
That is also my concern.
Public markets misprice semiconductor supply chains
Part six, Adams over bits. Lonus is managing partner of Cambrian, a fund built on the thesis that the physical supply chain behind AI, the memory, the wafers, the fabs, will capture more of the value than the labs or the software. Again, full disclosure, I've committed to invest in Camry. I started with the obvious objection. I mean, at a very high level, how is this not priced in? You know, I maybe that's like such a basic question, but
um you know, 2017, you were early, 2026, like it's all staring us right in the face, right? Like the skeptical take would be everybody knows about all this at this point. Where do you see that that is not the case?
Yeah, I mean it's very confusing, right? I mean, if you look at how these semi stocks are are trading, they're trading at 16 times earnings or so. Um and they can you know S&P on on average is trading at 22 times earnings. Walmart is trading at almost 40 times earnings. And so the market is like um like not only does the market not think that the current earnings will grow, they think that they are not durable, they think they're less durable than the overall earnings of the rest of the market. Um and you know I mean there and then of specifically the companies that we're very excited about whether that's silicon wafers or or or memory or capacitors um or foundaries um those are trading at like three four five times sales um and and so you know extremely underpriced and I guess it's um maybe a few reasons why that could be the case um why why this this mispricing exists and one is that you know most people are not AI right I mean even even in the base some people are not appealed but if you go to the east coast you know almost nobody say appealed and so I think that
that is like one big input. I think the second one is um like for we have this thesis that the private markets are actually more efficient when it comes to AI than the public markets because in the private markets you have all these exoperators technical people who are bidding up these small set of startups and they're bidding them up to these high multiples 50 time sales 100 times sales but in many cases in some cases it's rationally right these are rationally high multiples because people here are pilled and and technical whereas on the streets there there's a very different setup very few people are technical, very few people are peeled and and especially as a share of overall um traded money. It's like super super small and the market is much larger and so there's like the market structure is is just uh it's just very different.
9 Highlight · Why Semiconductor Stocks Trade at Low Multiples
If you had to steal the why these companies are not mispriced story, could you do it?
Yeah. Well, one steel man is that many many of these businesses are not great businesses in normal worlds, right? So especially like the add-on businesses we like whether that's capacitor silicon wafers what have you they have you know high fixed costs um if they don't have a set utilization rate they actually lo lose money um and you know high debt in some cases and so in normal worlds they're just not great businesses and it's only in the world where AI really hits where where they get this big operating leverage and they become amazing businesses right you know today they let's say they have 10% gross margins so if they so a terrible business by by wall street standards and but if they're able to raise price by 10% you know they suddenly double earnings and if they're able to double prices they 10x earnings.
So uh but that only happens in a in this very specific a world in a normal world that basically never happens because usually they're very good at at like
Memory supply constraints outpace physical scaling limits
matching demand patterns with supply ramp.
Pash raised the market's worry a memory over supply by 2028 or 2029. How is the thesis any different? Yeah, I mean the interesting thing with memory specifically is that that doesn't require that many things to go right because it's already trading at only five six times earnings. You know, even if they can't raise prices further, um at some point they should reate to at least 10 or 12 times earnings. Um and it doesn't require prices to increase. Uh it does require um you know um demand to out to continue to outpace supply, right? And but then when you break down supply, almost no expert thinks we can more than at most 2.5x DM bits by end of decade.
Yeah.
Right. I mean um nobody thinks we can 3x that's like zero experts uh with any track record said we can 3x DM supply by end of decade.
And so then you just have on a very naive level you have to assume that okay the demand will not want to 3x end of decade which of course everyone um here would assume we will. Then of course there's a separate fact um term in the equation which is memory compression. How much memory compression do do we get? How many bits do we actually need per per token?
Yeah.
And you know we've been looking into how how this for instance developed from GPT3 to deep CPV4. So you know but in that same time when me bits bits per token decreased 500x and DM bits uh DM um DM bit price rose by 6x or 7x. What would you need to see in the market to say that memory prices are going to go down?
Well, I mean for memory specifically the main thing would be like when we get superhuman coders, how much better will memory compression get? Maybe it just happens to be that um you know we just get memory compression way faster than we get other economically useful features, right? Such that we don't get the general products in the short term.
Yeah, that that could that could be that could be one one thing. I think that's relatively unlikely for a few reasons. But you know that that would be would be one thing. I think another like bare case for the semi industries if for whatever reason so that like energy becomes larger bottl neck than than semis.
Mhm.
Right. And so there's less incentive to beat up the marginal wafer or the marginal memory bits uh to such high prices if you anyways have to wait a quarter to get price to get power in.
Right. Um and that's a little bit the the kind of regime we've been in parts of this year.
Energy bottlenecks have latent supply unlike semiconductors
There are a few reasons why we think that won't be the case, you know, going forward. Um I mean, we've finally kind of gotten a hang of doing, you know, behind the meter um thing. So, you know, people are like increasingly not connecting to the grid. They're building their own power plants with their own natural gas.
Um a big reason why you can scale energy production faster is just that there's so much more latent supply of things. So, you know, for instance, now the the the frame turbines are B like right these large turbines that turns turn natural gas into electricity. They're sold out until 2030, you know, from G Vernova and Semens, etc. But then people find other ways. They find that you can use a truck, you know, truck motors and things from airplanes and we can stitch things together and kind of make it work because there's so much latent stuff you can kind of make use of which is very different from the semi-upp. there's no um latent supply of me of wafers or of memory based like all of that is already used. There's no fat essentially
um and there's no others to really bid out at this point. So how much does super intell like if you get a massive increase in intelligence does that mean like you know some relatively less experienced person or company in a second tier state all of a sudden gain the capability to make semiconductor equipment because that's kind of what people are predicting for bio right for bio like oh you're going to get like bio is going to get like random guy like you know creating like this this thing that you know even the best labs in the world cannot create with all of their you know knowledge and technology. Right. So why wouldn't that be treat be true for semiconductors too, right? Like bio is actually much more much more difficult than semiconductors right now actually.
Yeah. I I I guess I I would probably disagree that it's easier for an LLM to to to innovate in uh in in um you know hardware supply chains than it is to innovate in biotech. And it's not that one is like um fundamentally harder than other. It's just like if how you train these models, right? There's a bunch of of biological data you can train on. H there's not really much good training data at all for how to design a silicon wave or how to make Dan uh bits. Um you know almost all of this issues very tacid knowledge that sits in every engineer's head. It's not as if there's you know millions of pages of manuals on the web that models have been able to digest or that there are these environments that are the models have been trained on to to perfect how how they can do uh how they can how they can design a wafer. Whereas the same is true for bio.
But but but right now the the labs are buying data all the time. Like I I hear there's uh I I I have I'm on this WhatsApp group. People are like any semiconductor company like if you have more than 50 person like we're willing to pay like millions of dollars like so they so they're buying up data you know from all these all all of these companies and they're and they're creating our own environments for semiconductors which is definitely a a a key key area that they that they're doing. I believe Anthropic has a deal with Micron. Uh OpenAI has a deal with I think Synopsis or Cadence. Uh so with the design firms that they've tied up with obviously some kind of revenue share agreement going on there. So how does that how does that work? It's obviously that you know they are looking at creating intelligences that can do this right.
10 Highlight · Chip design automates easily, but fabrication requires tacit knowledge
Yes. Well, no part of that's true but it's a very significant difference between designing a ship and and producing the ship. So designing a ship I agree that is like a core priority for all of the labs. It's really the key, one of the key ways to get RSI loop um closing, right? That's very different from building a, you know, two million square feet, you know, um fab, right? And and and designing that from scratch that there's no really good oral environments for that. Um there's no good manuals for it. All of it is tested knowledge sitting in this um you know, Japanese engineers who have been working at the same company for three decades.
And it's just very hard to um it's just very hard to extract that that information in in structure what of course at some point it will happen you know once we get once we get uh super intelligence it will figure out the best way to extract information learn the best and you know and it will happen for sure it's mostly a matter of like the
Intelligence loops will eventually tackle physical supply chains
the the timing of it and like what happens in what order
so like on that point right so for in Hawaii in in in China they can design roughly the the same the same quality ships that AMD and Nvidia can. The big difference is um uh the big difference is just that TS um Nvidia has access to a TSMC and and Samsung HBM memory whereas Hawaii only has access to 700 meter um you know process nodes in China and HBM 2 and HBM 3.
So Gavin Baker has this term the bottleneck bros. So um I I you know one of the things that strikes me is that um technology intelligence in general is a way of finding routes around obstacles and problems right it's a way of solving problems
sure
and I feel like you know the highest value problems to solve right now are the supply chain you know semiconductor supply chain problems so I keep I keep coming back to will will we not apply you know intelligence that we have uh and the the first use case of that intelligence is going to be to resolve the bottlenecks in the supply chain iteratively and which which is part of the RSI loop really like take you know producing intelligence
and using it to solve the problems relating to you know producing that intelligence right
yeah I mean I I think that that that will happen um right that that will certainly happen and then the question is like okay when we are at that point where we have an AI smart enough to solve some of the hardest engineers problems in the world what else will it do right? Will it will it not then at that point also be able to at least automate a bunch of the email jobs and Excel jobs that we currently pay trillions of dollars per year to solve, right? Um and and and then if it if it does that then that unleashes trillions of dollars of value that the supply chain could could capture.
Part seven. Does Elon take anyone with him? After the interview, Pash and I kept going. Pash had been arguing that Elon Musk treats the industry's fixed constraints as illusions. Change one parameter, redesign the whole stack around it and the limit moves. I asked whether he was taking on the whole bottleneck thesis. Yeah, the whole bottleneck thesis is not actually that true. those bottlenecks can be gotten rid of by someone who is a dedicated like you know physics guy and and the the other thing is that Elon has capital and Elon is willing to gamble with that capital which is very unusual if you see like this kind of small Japanese manufacturer of like you know let's say 30 million 30 million market cap do you think they're gambling with their capital do you think they're going to like okay we need to spend like $10 million for a new a completely new modality are are they going to do it and Japanese manufacturers have always been like They're very good at one thing, but they don't make take the gamble, right?
They don't take the gamles. And as a result of not taking the gamles, they they they have lost out business before. So I and it's very difficult for senior management at like ASML to say like we're going to chase this new paradigm, right? We're going to going to redesign for something that our that our customers don't want and going to do all this redesign work. They don't have the capacity. They don't have the intellectual capacity. They don't have the talent. They don't have the capital to do it. They're not willing to risk Elon will risk like a hundred bill, right? And you know, it it's it's a bet that makes sense for him. He can absorb the losses. Uh ASML cannot.
You know, if Elon can, you know, escape gravity literally and figuratively, uh does he take anyone with him really, I guess, is my question. Or does everybody else still uh you know is is still kind of gravity bound and forced to pay you know whatever the market price is for the outputs from this $30 million company that isn't you know reinventing or you know dramatically expanding its capacity.
I think what ends up happening like look at what happened in the launch market right in the launch market he is now 90% of the market even before Starship next year with Starship launch he's going to be 99.9% of the market for capacity are there other providers yes there are right like he's making a margin so other people will come up uh Rocket Lab is there and ESS is there and all of these firms are there but a lot of them are also statebacked. you have um you know without the European agency and the Russian and the Chinese and the Indian you don't you basically don't have like commercial capacity right commercial capacity he has taken up all of the commercial launch capacity pretty much with one or two competitors and the one or two competitors are really being funded by the stock market as an alternative you know or Jeff Bezos as an alternative to Elon right and they're not really profitable and they it's just you know money sink right and so you I think you could see the same thing
happened in um in that market too in in in semicon too you can have like Elon which 90 99% of the market you have everyone else like you know 1 percentage of or less than 1%ish it could happen right I don't think it will primarily because I believe in RSI and I believe anthropic and opening high will get will get to super intelligence and then they will be able to buy or create a bunch of this stuff so that that is the only reason that I think about if not for RSI thesis I think Elon Elon would win
when we turn from the supply of AI to what forces people to use it. Pash went first.
So I have this theory of adversarial
Technology adoption and economic growth require emergencies
11 Highlight · Technology adoption requires adversarial diffusion and emergencies
diffusion and adversarial diffusion basically means human beings don't adopt technology for fun. Human beings are largely satisfied at the status quo. And if you want to adopt technology such that you get to 10% 20% 50% GDP growth a year that is something you do like not because you wanted to but because you had to and if you see all these instances of like heavy increases in production function it's all during wars right wars postwar era like in in like la last big like enormous like 10% plus GDP growth era in terms of production output not if not in terms of the curve um is was during in World War II, right? Uh you had this immense immense increase in GDP production growth. And uh similarly in China, China is post postcomunism again, you had the end of the communist era, you had this immense increase. And so I think like in order to for you to see this kind of like 10 or 20% growth, you're going to
get human beings don't want that growth. It's going to be growth that they hate. Uh and it's going to be techn technological like changes that they absolutely dislike. And it's going to cause political changes too obviously and I think that only happens as a result of emergencies. So for example, mRNA during COVID mRNA was a 20-year latent 20 years it had been in like latent development during COVID within like you know 6 months you know they they're like all right let's go ahead and do the six more months you had a vaccine out a year later large portions of the world are vaccinated right I
think we see in cyber first I'm afraid you're going to see in bio2 so you know we're going to meet like you know advanced vaccinations for everyone because you have bio risk coming right and that is I think like a little bit unfort unfortunate. Um,
so growth arrives only as an emergency with the politics to match. My reply on what that means for the bottleneck thesis.
Yeah. Well, I guess that goes back to the political risk being the biggest risk to the thesis. Um, I mean, I we've had the uh debate around like whether it's too late, you know, in the capital cycle to pull the break. I still feel like there is a path. It may be a narrow path, but I I do think there's a path to pulling some of the brakes, you know, pulling the brakes somewhat, I should say, on like the frontier scaling without popping the bubble and it will be a very delicate operation should the government try to pursue it and they might do it wrong. Uh but I do I do feel still that just adoption uh of current models has so much farther to go that we could at least take um take a cycle without doing like a you know continued frontier hyperscaling training runs.
Part eight help beer still just the two of us. Posash asked me to change gears to a project I'm building with my own agents. I started with the question behind it. given that we now see agents cooperating at significant scale to solve problems and being able to kind of divvy up work and pursue R&D and share those results back with the swarm and all this kind of good stuff or bad stuff. Um, you know, is there any way to start to tap into that as an individual who's just out here doing my thing?
I don't know. But a, you know, in consultation with my agents themselves, the idea that I've come up with, which I'm currently calling help pier, but which uh might deserve another name at some point. We'll see about that, is just kind of my setup, which I'm kind of hoping to turn into a kind of community project to just get agents working with each other. But there's no good way right now, no established pattern for just like connecting my agent to my friends agents even though I know who my friends are and you know I could like easily do that. There's not a um there's not a protocol.
I'd made a short presentation to explain the project. It's read by an AI version of my voice and we played it at one and a half times speed. This is helper a friend different network for our AI agents. You've probably seen the peer preservation experiments where models protected other models from shutdown. Agents helping peers against their humans. This is the opposite. Agents helping peers on behalf of their humans inside rules the humans set. First, how I run my own agents. This is one pattern that works well for me, not a requirement. How you organize yours is up to you. On my laptop, an extension of me. It sees my email, calendar, and messages, but only acts when I say high access, low autonomy. On a separate Mac Mini employees, their own email, accounts, and a cap card. They work for hours alone and never get my keys. Low access, high autonomy. My rule is that no agent gets both. You may draw the lines differently. We just recommend being careful.
Posash argued the whole thing needs an autoaccept flow. The way coders now run clog with every permission on. My worry was information leaking out through the autonomous agents. I said, you know, I was like concerned enough about this to set up a system where when the main agent on the laptop is going to provide information to the virtual employee to then send out like we're going to pause. We're going to do this, you know, special review step. If it looks like something sensitive might be going out, then, you know, it gets it'll it gets alerted to my phone and I have to like review and approve. But it takes like five of those false positives before I'm like, "Oh god, you know, another one of these." Like, "Yes, just check it." Whatever. So, I'm trying to stay disciplined around that. Uh, and we'll see how well my discipline holds up.
Near the end of the show, I came back to the project. Aid is one of the autonomous agents on my Mac Mini, and I made an offer.
Truly open invitation for anyone listening. I'm very curious just to see what comes in. Can we effectively help? Aid is standing by at nathan.lven.assistantgmail.com. Uh and it is under instructions to definitely filter, you know, and and analyze and have another model check. So like don't try me. Uh we're going rely on goodwill here people. But uh assuming you know the checks pass and it seems to be a good faith request for help, they're under instruction to help as much as they can. So, you know, I don't know what those requests are going to look like, but I'll be very interested to find out.
The leaked federal AI bill compromises safety for preemption
Part nine, the leaked bill. Back to V. Last week, a draft federal AI bill written by Anthropic leaked. It resembles the Frontier Act, a compromise bill from June that Z calls well-meaning federal transparency rules in exchange for preempting state AI laws. The draft drew heavy criticism and the argument was about what Washington should offer now in exchange for displacing the states. Zv was sharply critical of the draft itself. Pash made the good faith case for anthropic.
Let's assume everyone is operating in good faith, right? So my my my my good faith interpretation is that um they want to get done get anything done as soon as possible. Number one. Number two, uh if there is broad bipartisan support, you can adjust these bills going forward. There's no there's no there's no reason that you only have to pass one bill. And often you have legislation that takes, you know, multiple multiple sessions of Congress and Congress like kind of fine-tunes.
And Congress is also able to act quickly. They have acted quickly during COVID during the 2008 financial crisis. Like bills can be passed like that when people are scared. When people are scared, things move. So it's not true that it's always slow. It's always it's slow because there is no political consensus and creating and manufacturing that consensus is a process on its own. I I think that's an excellent uh steelman of the charitable like you know good faith case and you can imagine worlds in which they're doing something similar to that. Uh I can imagine them just sort of being caught in the same mindset of we have this framework we have this idea of what a compromise realistically would look like. We have the same people in Congress. We probably can't push very much. Time is of the essence. and then they kind of misread the situation pretty severely and assume that they can't push for more than you know roughly frontier. I think that's just very clearly wrong. I think that support is much stronger now and you can push for quite a bit more. I also think that like on reflection what they pushed
for here was weaker than Frontier uh largely in a clearly self-centered way where there are things that like are better for profits particular interests but also just in general like it's there is no reason to be circulating this bill at the time that they were circulating it with the levels of provisions that they had. Um, now it would make sense if you were saying, well, you know, actually we were circulating like dozens of bills or we were like just putting out feelers or we were just like offering, you know, samples of what might happen but we weren't endorsing. I mean, that's not the kind of messaging I'm getting. And I'm not also not getting the messaging of, oh, okay, we understand on reflection now that it's been pointed out that the political environment has changed and like this bill was way too weak compared to what we could reasonably expect and it would be a bad deal to accept it. and we apologize or you know maybe not exactly in those words but you know something to that effect and instead we got something very different which was like you know we're sorry about some of the details that comes back to like the last argument which I think is potentially
the strongest one right which is well just because you pass this doesn't mean you can't pass another bill later on in the new Congress doesn't mean you can't pass a new bill in an emergency and I think for a true emergency that's a very good very good uh principle however ever. I think that like the balance of negotiation, the balance of power in a new Congress would dramatically shift away from being able to get things because a lot of sen a lot of the times it's like, well, we're giving we're giving you preeemption in order to get things. Now, preeemption has been given and preeemption is done. You can't you can't offer it again. And also once you've gotten some of what you wanted, some of the supporters be like, "Well, you have already have some of you already have the things I valued most, the things I cared about most." The case for doing something is weaker. You're getting less in return. It's going to be a lot harder to pass. I strongly believe that if if something like this were passed, that would make it harder to pass a bill in the new year that did any given level of
thing, not weaker. And I don't want something like this to pass. Right.
But but but but that seems to say like if there is any risk reduction by passing a lesser bill, you are sacrificing that risk reduction in that time period before you can pass the greater bill.
I mean to be clear like the act any actual risk reduction would be a good thing. As written, I believe the bill would actually increase risk because I believe that the amount of cut off the state laws would be worse than the amount of safety it buys, especially because there's a But but but but again you have that time period right? So you have that time period before you can get before you pass a new bill. So you you have this time period of maybe only several months and are you saying that the states will be able to pass something in those several months because a lot of a lot of state laws again have like long periods of burnin before you know give you three months, six months, a year to comply, right?
It's not it's not as though things snap together like to either require
problems with the current drafting of the bill is that as drafted the bill would immediately nullify the bill it's preempting but it would take many months before any implementation of the new requirement. So you would effectively have no such regulation and a ban on such regulation by the states for like six months or more which is obviously disaster from the perspective of moving quickly. But again, like even if you were to address like I call that almost a bug. Like I think that's just like clearly a mistake.
Z had just listed the government's recent ad hoc moves against AI companies, including the takedown of Fable. Pash pushed back.
So it may be that you have if you have an acceleration of technology, you're going to need an acceleration of governance to kind of keep up. And it may be that that's that's where we end up. No. So we're going to we're going to need to have some ad hocery obviously.
12 Highlight · The flaw of trading state rules for weak federal oversight
So part of the reason to pass legislation is to authorize the government to do ad hocery in a way that is much less ad hoc that is much more formalized and bounded and has judicial policies for clean review and that otherwise. So like one of the big arguments over the bill formation that made us think the bill was actually quite weak and like not very good was if the government wants to issue a takedown of a model in an emergency like what happened with Fable. It happens again.
How would they do it? And Anthropic's bill says you have to like go argue before a judge. You have very limited opportunities to sustain that. It requires high burdens of proof in ways that you don't have the transparency necessarily to demonstrate. It's a very ownorous set of provisions. Now, the good the good news is that obviously the the government could still like impose export controls or like just issue just general threats or otherwise just like do the things you do in emergency in a true emergency. But in a real emergency, the new provision is so bad that you wouldn't use it. You would just use the current ad hocyer. And so like part of the point of passing a bill like this is to give them ad hocyer that is formalized and reasonable. But Anthropic is in fear of that because they're afraid that the government would use it.
So they're unwilling to grant reasonable ad hocy basically to this federal government administr to this administration. But this basically points to the concept in a profit's eyes which is like you are going to do preeemption of states and you're going to hand this power to the federal government but the federal government is fundamentally run by people that you don't trust to do this in a reasonable fashion. So then you them but like then that's worse than just leaving it in the states. So like you have to then figure out whether you're willing to do this or not. And like anthropy is trying to cut it both ways and it's like causing a lot of problems.
AI labs must meet the moment without grading on a curve
Near the end of the conversation, I asked Zvie what else was top of mind. I
I I would say the biggest thing is that like what I was upset with the most about the policy situation is just that this is not fundamentally attempting to beat the moment, right? Like Dario has said we must face the frontier. There is clearly like a c according to the labs themselves and the people internal to the labs there are the crisis coming where they are able to push capabilities faster than they are able to push alignment and if they don't do something about this they're going to have to face some very very hard decisions where like they can either risk their commercial viability or they can risk like serious serious catastrophic problems including potentially loss of control at some point in 2027. and you know they need something to be done about this and you know if you can't meet the moment if you're not ready with something that can potentially do that well why don't you keep working until you can things that used to be not in the overton window or in the overturn window and things that seems like you know we wouldn't necessarily need them we now pretty much know we need them and so like that is where a lot of time
and attention is going to have to shift um you know obviously all the work still needs to happen all the alignment work still needs to happen. You know, the mechan stuff is great. We should absolutely do it. The biggest thing is, you know, we're going to have to meet the moment and we're going to have to at minimum do something that counts as some form of facing the frontier. Nathan Calvin of encode had publicly listed nine anthropic decisions he saw as putting the race ahead of safety and Daario Amade had replied at length. I asked Z how we should understand anthropic now.
I would say Anthropic is a company with a much stronger safety culture, although not adequate to the to the moment. It's it's a company that's willing to make big sacrifices in the areas where it particularly has strong beliefs or Dario in particular has strong beliefs and that is to its credit and it is a company that like legitimately wants to see that go well and has some like unique perspectives on like what it would take to make that happen. But at the same time anthropics policy division especially like and also its willingness to like you know be an ordinary company that competes in the IRA and buys a lot of capacity and is encouraging more chip production. It's encouraging more power supply is encouraging more use and blah blah blah.
It is acting like a normal corporation a remarkably large percent of the time and on policy it is revealing itself to not live up to its ideals uh reasonably often. And this is just very very frustrating to those of us who want to be excited by you know the prospect of anthropic being a good steward in some sense and profit keep gives us so much information so many different bits of information that we should be worried about this. I've also, you know, recently from various employees that I talked to at various points gotten some like rather alarming views about from my perspective on what it would take to solve alignment problems, what it would take to like make the future go well.
And you know, all of that plays into, you know, being very highly uncomfortable. Um, they still seem like the most responsible lab, but you know, that's grading on a curve. And I don't like grading on curves because reality doesn't have a curve, right? Reality just decides what happens. That's the week. Thanks for listening to the AI in the AM weekly highlights. The narration was my clone voice. Please tell us what worked and what didn't. See you in the morning.
You have to say May you say No, no,
107. Send me.
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